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BOOK SYMPOSIUM
Action and its parts
Alessandro Duranti, University of California, 
Los Angeles
Comment on Enfield, N. J. and Jack Sidnell. 2017. The concept of 
action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The concept of action (hereafter “CoA”) by Nick Enfield and Jack Sidnell is a wel-
come discussion of two key theoretical and methodological issues in the study of 
language-mediated interaction, namely, (a) whether or not speakers need access to 
an inventory of types of acts in order to produce or respond to a meaningful act 
(in the form of an utterance or gesture or combination of the two), and (b) the im-
pact of language-specific grammatical or lexical forms (e.g., words, pronouns, par-
ticles, tense-aspect markers) on how speakers understand or carry out a particular 
type of action (e.g., agreeing, requesting, claiming previous knowledge). The latter 
issue falls under the general phenomenon known as “linguistic relativity,” a phrase 
and concept associated with the writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956) and pre-
figured in Franz Boas’ (1889) groundbreaking discussion of speakers’ difficulty in 
hearing meaningful phonetic distinctions in a language different from their native 
one(s). By exploring these two issues, Enfield and Sidnell sketch the outlines of 
an ontology of action that distinguishes between what is available to participants 
in the midst of interaction and what analysts subsequently describe, categorize, 
and try to explain. Some parts of the book reproduce arguments previously made 
by the two authors either jointly or separately. The integration of these previous 
contributions into a single volume should help readers grasp the bigger picture and 
to evaluate the logic of argumentation of the specific proposals that Enfield and 
Sidnell offer. Whether one agrees or not with the details of their approach, this is a 
good book to think with. 
At the beginning of chapter 2, Enfield and Sidnell mention Malinowski’s inter-
est in the study of language as an “instrument of social action (and interaction)” 
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(32)—the addition of “interaction” to Malinowski’s original formulation turns out 
to be important, as we will see. This is presented as a way for the authors to distin-
guish themselves from those in “the sub-discipline named linguistic anthropology” 
who focus on “the relation between language and thought (and the consequences 
of linguistic diversity for thinking)” and from those who have shifted “from a focus 
on language in use … to a focus on people’s ideas about language … under the guise 
of what is known as language ideologies” (33). In the midst of this shift, they claim 
that “an anthropological account of language as action got lost” and the “promise 
of mid-century ordinary language philosophy … put forth by Austin and Wittgen-
stein – and indeed before them by Malinowski” (33) has not been fulfilled. 
It is hard to exclude “the relation between language and thought” in a book like 
CoA that deals with inference, guessing, reflecting, realizing, doubting, and even 
“thought” (42). The analysis of these and other experiences in terms of how they 
are being made explicit through particular behaviors, acts, or turns does not per se 
exclude them from the domain of “thought” pursued by philosophers, cognitive 
scientists, and other scholars who are comfortable with using mental constructs. 
Nor is “thought” or “thinking” easily excluded by invoking Peirce’s notion of inter-
pretant (23–8, 35, 65, etc.) or Silverstein’s use of “indexical relations” (128–30). In 
fact, the nature of indexes (e.g., address forms, pointing gestures, regional accents) 
is such that they “may be transposed from the current context into other ones, re-
called, imagined or merely projected” (Hanks 2001: 121, emphasis added). Rather 
than excluding “thought” or “thinking” altogether from the study of language as 
action, it makes sense to follow an approach that examines how members of a 
particular (speech) community talk (or not) about experiences such as thinking, 
guessing, reminding (which Enfield and Sidnell also do, for example, on page 37) 
and whether they treat such inner experiences as some kind of obscure or danger-
ous entity that is better left unmentioned or unknown (e.g., Rosen 1995; Robbins 
and Rumsey 2008). 
As for the indeed popular study of language ideologies, in its concern for “peo-
ple’s ideas about language,” I see the effort to document and explain the social im-
pact of those ideas on educational policy, debates about national languages, indi-
vidual and collective sense of identity, and, among other issues, the reproduction of 
racist stereotyping (e.g., Bucholtz 2001; Hill 2001; Alim, Rickford and Ball 2016). 
For these reasons I do not think that over the last few decades “an anthropologi-
cal account of language as action got lost.” Not only do Enfield and Sidnell them-
selves mention a number of linguistic anthropologists who have been pursuing 
this very issue, but there are specializations within linguistic anthropology that are 
manifestly dedicated to the study of language as action, including language social-
ization (e.g., Duranti, Ochs and Schieffelin 2012) and the study of language contact 
and missionization (e.g., Makihara and Schieffelin 2007; Hanks 2010). 
If I am right in saying that linguistic anthropologists are still pursuing the 
study of “language as action,” why are Enfield and Sidnell feeling alone in their 
endeavor? A possible answer is hinted at by the insertion of “(an interaction”) after 
“action” in the above-mentioned evocation of Malinowski. “Interaction” is short-
hand for an understanding of “language” as “the directly observable collaborative 
practices of using words, grammar, and associated semiotic resources, in human 
interaction” (ix). This is an approach that draws from the field of “conversation 
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analysis,” which Enfield and Sidnell know well and to which they have contributed 
over the last decade (e.g., Enfield and Levinson 2006; Sidnell 2009, 2010). Conver-
sation analysis is an inductive approach on interaction as “the primordial site of 
language” (Schegloff 2005: 455) and turn-taking as a prime form of social organi-
zation. The focus on conversation started with Harvey Sacks’ analysis of recorded 
phone calls to a suicide center (see Schegloff 1992: xv–xvii), and then expanded 
its focus of inquiry to a range of interactional contexts, including therapy sessions, 
informal phone conversations between friends or family members, and doctor–
patient interactions, and other institutional encounters (Heritage and Clayman 
2010). Contributions by conversation analysts are seen as groundbreaking by a 
growing number of scholars in a wide range of fields. There has also been criti-
cism for the exclusive focus on “interaction” or “talk-in-interaction” (Schegloff 
1988)—as opposed to “society,” “language,” “mind,” “power,” “inequality,” and oth-
er concepts traditionally studied by social or cognitive scientists—as well as for the 
rejection by most conversation analysts of findings based on traditional methods 
like participant-observation, elicitation, interviews, or sampling techniques. It is 
in this historical context, I believe, that Enfield and Sidnell’s comments about lin-
guistic anthropologists’ current foci of study must be evaluated. CoA is a contribu-
tion to an ontology of action (see in particular chapter 4), inspired by the methods 
developed by conversation analysts, who prefer to keep ethnographic information 
to a minimum. 
One main focus of CoA is how people interacting with one another understand 
how to react appropriately to what was just said or done by someone else, including 
the extent to which such an understanding entails the recognition of a particular 
type of (speech) act. For example, when someone says that’s a nice shirt (10), does 
the addressee need to understand that both an assessment and a compliment have 
been produced in order to know that he could respond by saying thanks or by 
some other response that acknowledges the compliment but rejects the positive 
assessment (e.g., I wasn’t sure this would be appropriate)? Or when someone asks 
do you know what time it is?, does the recipient need to classify the question as a 
“request for information” (about the time) in order to be able to produce an ad-
equate response (e.g., It’s ten after five)? This issue has been discussed by Stephen 
Levinson (2013) under the name of “action ascription,” which is meant to replace 
“action recognition” used by Emanuel Schegloff (2007: xiv), one of the founders 
of conversation analysis. Recognition has indeed been a major theme in conversa-
tion analysis, starting from the discussion of the opening sequence in phone calls 
(see Sacks 1992: Lecture 1 [1964–65]; Schegloff 1968) and the use of first names 
(e.g., John, Penny) as preferred forms for personal reference to achieve recognition 
(Sacks and Schegloff 1979). 
The problem with the term “recognition” for Levinson (and also for Enfield and 
Sidnell) is that it makes it sound as if there is something that needs to be correctly 
guessed, namely, the type of action produced by the previous speaker. This view, 
for Levinson, is problematic because “the process of attributing an action to a turn 
is fallible, negotiated, and even potentially ineffable” (Levinson 2013: 104), and it 
must happen very fast: the utterance by the next speaker is on average produced 
within 200 milliseconds from the end of the turn of the previous speaker (Levinson 
2013: 103). 
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In the first four chapters of CoA, Enfield and Sidnell expand on this line of 
reasoning by exposing the problems of what they call the “binning approach” (46), 
which they attribute to speech act theorists. This approach, they claim, assumes 
that there is a pre-existing inventory of types of (speech) acts out of which speakers 
and hearers would pick one to produce or interpret a given utterance. In CoA the 
target of criticism, then, is not Schegloff ’s (or other conversation analysts’) use of 
the notion of “recognition,” as it is for Levinson (2013), but Austin’s (1962) theory 
of speech act types (and Searle’s reformulation of Austin’s original proposal). Start-
ing in chapter 3, which introduces the notion of agency, partly building on Paul 
Kockelman’s (2007) work, Enfield and Sidnell present their own alternative pro-
posal, packed with insightful observations, which become occasionally afflicted by 
some terminological or logical confusion. This confusion might be the price for 
pushing for a theoretical rethinking of the complex notion of action in a relatively 
short book (201 pages of text) and doing so while mixing theoretical approaches 
that are a bit like oil and water (e.g., conversation analysis and Peirce’s semiotics). 
Another challenge is the abandonment of terminology that has the intuitive appeal 
of Austin’s and Searle’s use of categories offered by ordinary language. The solu-
tion for Enfield and Sidnell is to distinguish between the metalanguage used when 
categorizing a particular act and the practice of acting “on the fly and infer[ring] 
what a speaker is doing from a broad range of evidence” (47). They point out that 
philosophers, linguists, and other analysts of ordinary talk are not the only ones to 
refer to speech types like requesting, apologizing, informing, etc. Native speakers 
do it too when they provide a description of their action, as in I was complimenting 
you (45) or I requested that he get off the table! (47). But these uses of speech types 
are not what routinely happens. In spontaneous interactions people “do not need 
to recognize action types or categories in order to respond appropriately (or inap-
propriately for that matter)” (124). Rather, participants are “considering the details 
of particular turns-at-talk for their relevance in deciding what to do next and how 
to do it” (124). 
The focus on the “details” is more than a methodological choice for Enfield and 
Sidnell. It is a theoretical stance that assumes that “actions can be dealt with at the 
token level and need not be seen as tokens of action types at all” (111). And here 
comes the punch line: “A radical version of our claim would be that there are no 
actions, only the parts of actions” (111). 
This “radical” claim needs some unpacking. A concern for “parts” usually im-
plies a mereology, that is, a theory of the relation of part to whole and of parts 
among themselves but always within a whole (e.g., Husserl 2001: 161–80). This 
means that, logically speaking, “token” only makes sense in opposition to “type,” 
and therefore any rejection of the token-type relation is at least puzzling if not 
downright illogical. But what if Enfield and Sidnell mean something different from 
a theory of the parts without the whole? For example, the focus on the details/
parts could simply be a heuristic. This foregrounding of the details of interaction 
fits with a conversation analytical approach as well as with a grammatical analysis 
of utterances. Either approach can be contrasted with speech act theorists’ ten-
dency to look at speech acts as “wholes” without much attention to what happens 
inside of them, that is, without much sophistication in the use of particular tense/
aspects, or the sentential particles that are abundant in so many languages but not 
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so much in English (this reading is supported by the method of cross-linguistic 
analysis presented in chapter 5). Another way to interpret the focus on parts/de-
tails is as an attempt to adopt a “distributed cognition” approach, which Enfield 
and Sidnell mention (87) and from which they derive the notion of “distributed 
agency” (see chapter 3). According to this approach, participants do not need to 
know or decide the type of act of a particular utterance because its interpretation is 
distributed across semiotic and material resources such that no one participant or 
“agent” is in full control. This idea is implied in Husserl’s notion of intersubjectivity 
and its various interpretations and modifications (Merleau-Ponty 1945; Jackson 
1998; Duranti 2010, 2015: 208–32) as well as in Vygotsky’s discussion of mediation 
within a socio-historical approach (Cole 1985). 
Focusing on parts might also be supported by the simultaneous adoption of the 
idea of a “larger project” that guides and gives meaning to specific moves (Levinson 
2013). This is what Enfield and Sidnell seem to be aiming at with their discussion of 
a “ladder of action” and the distinction between “practices” and “actions” (105–6). 
The use of these two interdependent categories, however, entails the notion of typi-
fication, which is what they had been trying to avoid. This is not accidental. It has 
to do with the fact that typification cannot be avoided by participants as well as by 
analysts. But by accepting types, one does not need to accept Austin’s or Searle’s 
ways of typifying. It also does not mean to accept the idea that the relevant type 
for a particular sign or sequence of acts is decided ahead of time and once and for 
all. When we look at the ways in which cooperative action is carried out and col-
laboration achieved, we see that “what is being done” or the “meaning” of what is 
being done not only changes over time (Goodwin 1979) but it must be designed 
so that it can change and adapt to the contextually given and contextually realized 
circumstances. This means that in any “ontology” of action, one must conceive 
of categories, types, or meanings to be sufficiently open entities. This openness, 
which is traditionally associated with artistic production (Eco 1962), allows for a 
certain level of ambiguity and room for invention, negotiation, and reformulation. 
The conventional ways of using goals, intentions, and plans for describing human 
action need to be rethought in order to allow for micro- and macro-adjustments 
and, above all, to allow for the improvisation that is a constituting quality of our 
ways of being in the world, as originally recognized by Bourdieu (1977: 79) in his 
adoption of the concept of habitus and as key in socialization (Duranti and Black 
2012). An openness of and in typification means that ready-made labels for types 
might not be what we need in order to understand what is really going on in a 
given interaction. Let me elaborate on this point by examining one of the examples 
provided in CoA. 
Enfield and Sidnell suggest that one can act in ways that are “adequate for the 
situation” (113, emphasis in the original) without having to consider the type of 
action that is being enacted. One example they give to illustrate this point involves 
an ambiguity between two possible speech act types. At the end of a meal a person 
holds a hand out across the table toward someone else who has a plate in front of 
him. This, they say, could be considered an “offer” or a “request,” but there is no 
need to decide because “whether it was a request or an offer is not an issue for the 
participants” (113). Perhaps. But how do we know that the choice is not an issue for 
the participants? Wouldn’t it be better to hypothesize that the type of action in this 
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case is neither “offer” nor “request,” but something of a different nature? Their ex-
ample could illustrate the relevance of an ethics of cooperation as facilitation, which 
makes a recipient, who also happens to be a guest, pick up the moveable object in 
front of him and give it to the person holding a hand in suspended motion as a way 
of helping complete what appears as an unfinished action sequence. Pursuing the 
latter interpretation pushes things in the direction of the distributed agency Enfield 
and Sidnell seem to be striving for, and it also adds an ethical dimension of action 
in the presence of another person (Levinas 1969) that is implied but not theorized 
in the discussion of accountability (in the Preface and on pages 53–61). 
As is made clear in the Postface, in their preference for details and parts, Enfield 
and Sidnell see their method of investigating language as continuing in a tradi-
tion that goes back to Wittgenstein’s anti-essentialism and his belief that there are 
“countless kinds” of words, sentences, acts, or games (Wittgenstein 1958: 11). This 
position contrasts with the one proposed by Austin, who believed that we should 
treat “uses of language” just like entomologists treat species of beetle, that is, by 
counting them all, one at a time (Austin 1970: 234). 
The diverse ways of doing “the same” action with words is the leading theme of 
chapter 5, “Collateral effects.” The action in question is the linguistic performance 
of an “epistemically authoritative second-position assessment” (137). If speaker A’s 
utterance he is rude is the first position assessment, an immediately following yes, 
he is very rude by speaker B would be the second-position assessment. The “epis-
temically authoritative” aspect of the exchange is the expression by speaker B of 
her “primary rights or greater authority to make such an evaluation” (138). Enfield 
and Sidnell’s detailed discussion of how this action is performed in three languages 
(Caribbean English Creole, Finnish, and Lao) shows that the morpho-syntactic re-
sources that each language has for speaker B to convey agreement and claim greater 
authority produce different effects on subsequent talk. For example, in Creole and 
Lao, the forms available to perform the action (an “if-prefaced” question and a per-
fective particle, respectively) seem to shut down further talk on the topic, whereas 
the Finnish variable word order seems to allow for further elaboration in subse-
quent talk. This is an elegant discussion of linguistic relativity that can constitute a 
model for further research. 
Chapter 6 counterbalances the relativity argument with a discussion of “natu-
ral,” and therefore potentially universal, ways of performing a particular action by 
means of language. Enfield and Sidnell focus on polar questions, i.e., yes-or-no 
questions, which can be answered by two grammatical constructions: (a) interjec-
tions (yes, no, as in did you get your paper? Yes), or (b) a language-specific “echo 
system” (e.g., in English, Is he home? He’s home). An interesting point made in this 
chapter is that the choice between these two formats, which are said to be available 
in all languages, is not arbitrary. Instead, the interjection “yes is less agentive than 
it is in response to a [polar] question” (188). This observation is further used to 
argue in favor of the importance of iconicity in language and the use of this type 
of linguistic analysis to assess different degrees of agency. The connection between 
language-mediated-interaction and language-encoded-agency made explicit in 
this chapter constitutes an achievement that will ensure that this book will hold 
an important place within current debates about human action in the social and 
cognitive sciences. 
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